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The author, Richard W. Richards, was a 22-year-old Aus-
tralian scientist attached to the Ross Sea Party sent to
Antarctica in support of Ernest Shackleton’s 1914 – 17
Imperial Trans-Antarctic Expedition. His book, a personal
journal, was first published by the Scott Polar Institute in
1962, more than 40 years after Richards and his teammates
were marooned in the Antarctic for two years.
The short introduction provides only a glimpse of the
Antarctic expeditions preceding Shackleton’s Trans-Ant-
arctic Expedition. Even so, the reader will quickly recog-
nize the British approach to polar exploration during the
so-called Heroic Age of Antarctic Exploration: the dread-
ful man-hauling of heavy sledges, inadequate rations,
scurvy, haphazard planning, and the reluctant use of skis
and dogs. As Richards points out, the onset of scurvy was
more or less constant with Scott in 1901 and 1912, with
Shackleton in 1908, and with the author’s own party in
1915 – 16.
Shackleton’s plans for the Trans-Antarctic Expedition
were fairly straightforward: the main party under
Shackleton’s leadership was to proceed to the Antarctic on
the Endurance. From the shores of the Weddell Sea,
Shackleton and a small party would attempt a transconti-
nental sled journey (man-hauling) across the South Pole to
the Ross Sea. Concerned that not enough provisions could
be transported that far, Shackleton had decided to send a
second ship, the Aurora, with a shore party, to McMurdo
Sound in the Ross Sea. The shore party was instructed to
place food depots every 60 miles as far south as Mount
Hope at the foot of the Beardmore Glacier, lat. 83˚37' S, a
distance of some 360 miles.
Following the introduction, the author describes the 40-
year-old former sealing vessel that brought the expedition
to the Ross Sea. The Aurora had been built in Dundee and
was more or less a sister ship to another famous Dundee
vessel, Terra Nova, used by Scott on his last Antarctic
expedition. The Aurora had seen service in both the Arctic
and the Antarctic. In 1884, she was involved, unsuccess-
fully, in a race to rescue the Adolphus Greely party and
reap the promised reward. In 1911, the Aurora was used by
the Douglas Mawson Australian Expedition. By 1914,
however, the ship was well past her prime. Leaking and
overloaded, she left Hobart on Christmas morning after
three days of what is described as mass confusion and a
frantic rush to get ready. Eighteen dogs were the last
addition to the cluttered deck load consisting of petrol,
coal, sheep, and odds and ends. On January 7, the party
sighted the Admiralty Range flanking the western shores
of the Ross Sea. The following day they made out the
snowy tip of Mount Erebus on Ross Island, the “promised
land,” as the author describes it. Their destination was
Cape Evans in McMurdo Sound, where the Aurora was to
be frozen in for the winter.
When the Ross Sea Party reached McMurdo Sound in
January 1915, the South Pole prize had already been
snatched by Norwegian explorer Roald Amundsen on
December 15, 1911. A British party under Robert Scott
had reached the same objective five weeks later, on Janu-
ary 17, 1912, but perished on the way back to McMurdo
Sound. In October 1909, Shackleton and his party had
man-hauled their way to within a hundred miles of the Pole
before turning back, barely surviving the return trip. On
that expedition, Ernest Joyce had been left in charge of
establishing an emergency depot, which undoubtedly saved
the lives of the return party. Joyce had also served with
Scott in 1900 and was the only member of the Ross Sea
Party with extensive Antarctic experience. Perhaps more
importantly, he was one of the few British polar expedition
members who appreciated the value of using dogs to haul
sledges. One of many expedition details not mentioned by
the author was the fact that Shackleton had originally
promised Joyce the leadership of the Ross Sea depot-
laying parties, a most sensible decision considering the
man’s experience. However, by the time the Ross Sea
Party headed for McMurdo Sound, Shackleton had changed
his mind and placed Captain Aeneas Mackintosh in charge.
Much of what went wrong during the Ross Sea Party
Expedition can be traced directly to this carelessly ex-
ecuted change of leadership.
In Chapter 3, the author briefly describes McMurdo
Sound and Ross Island, pointing out the location of huts
used by previous British expeditions. Hut Point (Discov-
ery Hut), about 13 miles south of Cape Evans, was built as
an emergency shelter by Scott’s party in 1901. The hut at
Cape Evans was erected by Scott’s party in 1911, and the
hut at Cape Royds was built by Shackleton’s party in 1907.
Fast ice prevented easy access to Ross Island and not until
January 17 was the Aurora secured along the ice a few
hundred yards offshore at Cape Evans. From the outset, the
reader is struck by the poor judgement and incompetence
often exhibited by the expedition leader, Mackintosh.
Before taking the Aurora a short distance toward Hut Point
to unload equipment and supplies for depot laying, he
unloaded 10 tons of coal and 100 cases of oil during low
tide at Cape Evans—unfortunately not far enough up the
shore. By the time the Aurora returned to the Cape, the
entire depot had vanished. Meanwhile, nine miles off Hut
Point, the Aurora was made fast to the ice edge. From here,
Mackintosh ordered four teams onto the Barrier for pre-
liminary depot laying as far south as 83˚S. The author was
a member of the fourth team, chosen to use the motor
sledge, which broke down shortly after reaching Hut Point.
With great difficulties and hardships, the other sledding
parties placed their depots and returned to Hut Point,
losing all but four of their eighteen dogs. The author
blames Mackintosh for subjecting the dogs to a sudden,
severe depot journey, without doing something to harden
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them up after their long period of inactivity aboard ship.
Since the author was barely involved with this episode, his
impressions and statements about the dogs undoubtedly
echo Joyce’s description of events. Richards also fails to
mention that during the final stages of the preliminary
depot laying, Joyce and Mackintosh had strong disagree-
ments over the continuing use of the dogs, who were dying
from fatigue. The loss of the dogs was to have serious
repercussions the following year.
Having accomplished essentially nothing, Richards and
his team returned to Hut Point, where there was no sign of
the Aurora. During their brief absence, the ship had been
carried out of the sound by a blizzard. Several days later,
spotting the crow’s nest of the ship over the headland of
Cape Evans, they lit a fire as a signal for the ship to steam
back and pick them up. The depot-laying members at Hut
Point, including the author, were taken aboard and brought
to Cape Evans, leaving six men still out on the depot trail.
The anchorage at Cape Evans was less than ideal. During
the first night, the ship drifted away in heavy seas, and
rigging and gear were quickly coated in thick ice. The
Chief Officer, Stenhouse, brought the ship back to Cape
Evans through newly formed ice and ordered steel hawsers
attached to two embedded anchors on shore as part of the
wintering preparations. Expedition plans called for a shore
party to occupy Scott’s hut while the remaining personnel
wintered on the ship.
In Chapter 4, the author describes the amazing trials and
tribulations experienced during the first winter at Cape
Evans. Incredibly, few supplies and no equipment had
been landed while the ship was nearby. During the evening
of May 6, 1915, a blizzard tore the Aurora from the
moorings, sending her out to sea. As soon as the weather
moderated, the four men at Cape Evans climbed the cliffs
behind their camp and scanned the sea for any signs of the
ship. There were none. In early June, the six members who
had been stranded at Hut Point made a hazardous crossing
over newly formed ice and reached Cape Evans. In spite of
being left without extra clothing, equipment, and supplies,
the ten marooned men decided to carry out the original
depot-laying plans for the following year. Fortunately for
them, enough stores and old equipment had been left
behind by Scott’s party to make that feasible, as long as the
larder was supplemented with plenty of seals.
Preparations for the 1915 – 16 depot laying are pre-
sented in Chapter 5. Given their lack of new equipment and
basic clothing, the men faced a gruelling challenge. By the
time the sun reappeared on August 22, stores and equip-
ment were ready to be transferred to Hut Point. In celebra-
tion, the men had their first sponge bath in eight months.
By October 1, the depot party of nine was assembled at Hut
Point, ready to begin the dreary task of man-hauling heavy
sledges across the vast barrier, while Rev. A. Stevens
continued meteorological observations at Cape Evans.
The first of three depot-laying excursions from Hut Point
was carried out without the use of dogs. To begin with, the
nine men tried to haul all three sleds. When that proved
nearly impossible, each sled was hauled separately by
three men. Relay trips were necessary, adding three miles
to the advance of one. On the second spring depot journey,
Joyce insisted on bringing the dogs. Not only did they
perform well, but the author admits that, had it not been for
the dogs, the entire party would have perished. The third
and final depot-laying journey started out from Hut Point
on December 8. The men were exhausted and undernour-
ished, and for several of them, the onset of scurvy added to
their misery. At a point where the author and his party were
supposed to turn back, the deteriorating condition of both
Mackintosh and Spencer-Smith dictated a change in plans:
all members of the depot party continued south. The
monotonous, miserable march continued day after day,
interrupted only by endless hours spent in ice-cold sleep-
ing bags, waiting out blizzards while nervously eyeing
diminishing rations. Cocaine was administered as eye
drops to relieve the pain of snow blindness. On January 6,
a defective Primus lamp caused one team of three men to
turn back. They reached Cape Evans 10 days later. The
remaining party struggled on. Forty miles from their final
destination, Spencer-Smith was unable to continue and
was left behind in a tent. On January 26, the five men
reached Mount Hope, where they placed Shackleton’s
depot, consisting of two weeks’ bagged food, three weeks’
oil, and biscuits for six men. Of course all of this was to no
avail—by this time, about 1000 miles away, the Endur-
ance had already sunk, leaving Shackleton’s party camped
on the drifting ice.
The author’s description of the return journey brings to
mind the desperate race for life of every British Antarctic
expedition prior to 1914. With Mackintosh barely able to
walk and others suffering from snow blindness, the depot
party reached Spencer-Smith on January 29. Unable to
walk, he was hauled on the sled for the next 40 days. Only
by desperate, exhausting marches did they reach each life-
sustaining depot. On February 18, a blizzard halted the
desperately weak men ten miles from the large depot at
Minna Bluff. Only three days’ rations remained: time and
options were running out. Ernest Wild volunteered to stay
behind with the ailing Spencer-Smith and Mackintosh,
while the author and his party with the dogs struggled
towards the depot. The author credits one dog, Oscar, in
particular for making the difference between life and
death. As Richards states, it was Oscar alone who provided
the extra strength needed for the party to reach the depot.
Forty miles from Hut Point, Mackintosh was again left
behind, while the others proceeded to get the rapidly
failing Spencer-Smith to Hut Point. Sadly he died shortly
before they reached Hut Point on March 11. With no sign
of the Aurora, the men knew that they would have to
endure yet another winter in Antarctica. Their most imme-
diate problem was to get everyone from Hut Point to Cape
Evans—over 13 miles of open water.
The author describes vividly the four months spent at
Hut Point before a safe crossing could be made. In early
May, Mackintosh made what the author considers an ill-
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advised decision. Accompanied by one other man,
Haywood, he headed out across the young sea ice for Cape
Evans. The two men were never seen again. The remaining
Hut Point party waited until July 15 before crossing and
arrived safely at Cape Evans. Ten months had passed since
they began the final depot-laying journeys. In total, they
had man-hauled sledges some 1500 miles, nearly twice the
distance to Mount Hope and back.
In the final chapter, Richards describes his sighting of
the Aurora on January 10, 1917. For the men ashore, the
sight of the ship brought great joy, not only because of
their own imminent rescue, but also for the fact that the
ship had survived the blizzard that broke it away from
Cape Evans nearly two years earlier. With Shackleton on
board, the Aurora had left Port Chalmers on December 20,
1916. On January 10, 1917, as the ship reached the ice edge
off Cape Royds, the crew sighted seven men with dogs and
sleds coming from Cape Evans. The author recounts that
the first man to reach him and the other men and shake their
hands was Shackleton. The Aurora arrived in Wellington
Harbour on February 9, 1917. Later that same year, the
ship disappeared without a trace after leaving Sydney,
Australia. Readers well versed in South Pole expedition
literature may well say of the Ross Shore Party story,
“three cheers for the dogs.” Oscar died in the Wellington
Zoo in 1939. Richards died in 1985 at the age of 91.
The Scott Polar Research Institute is to be commended
for re-issuing Richards’ account of his participation in the
Ross Sea Party Expedition. A broader and more general
readership of this work would have been well served by a
new introduction to the book that was more historically
inclusive than the brief statements provided by the author.
One or more updated maps would also have been a great
aid to the reader. Richards’ book adds little to Joyce’s 1929
account, which also served as the source for Shackleton’s
description of the Ross Sea Party in his book, South. The
account of the Ross Sea Party remains vastly overshad-
owed by Shackleton’s Endurance calamity. The fact that
three men, and very nearly the entire party, died while
carrying out their part of Shackleton’s lofty trans-Antarc-
tic plans may further explain the relative obscurity of this
episode, as it somewhat tarnishes the heroic shine of
Shackleton’s efforts.
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Setting out to dispel the myth that co-management and
land-claim processes are working, Hunters and Bureau-
crats: Power, Knowledge and Aboriginal-State Relations
in the Southwest Yukon is an important and sobering look
at the nature of Aboriginal-state relations in northern
Canada today. Because of the complex nature of the
struggles and logic of engagement involved, Aboriginal
peoples often pay a tremendous price for entering into co-
management and land-claim agreements. Nadasdy’s in-
depth ethnographic analysis of Aboriginal-state relations
in the southwest Yukon suggests that, far from being
empowering, the participation of Kluane First Nations
peoples in land-claim negotiations and on the Ruby Range
Sheep Steering Committee has threatened the very fabric
of who they are and how they relate to land, to animals, and
to each other. They have had to adopt the unfamiliar
languages, rules, and assumptions of wildlife biology and
property law, in some cases translating their own cultural
values and understandings into a “currency” that the state
can use. By accepting western European assumptions
about land, animals, and property, Kluane peoples have
been forced to set aside their own ways of knowing and
speaking. To engage bureaucratic representatives of the
state in co-management and land-claim processes, Kluane
peoples have had to learn, think, act, and organize them-
selves in very different ways and to develop bureaucratic
behaviours and institutions modelled after the state. These
new patterns have engendered a host of changes and
tensions that undermine the very culture and ways of life
that co-management and land-claim processes were sup-
posed to protect in the first place.
Nadasdy’s focus on the use of power and knowledge in
co-management and land claims is both refreshing and
long overdue, as he identifies many of the systemic barri-
ers and insidious processes of assimilation inherent in
these discourses. In fact, everyone currently involved in
these processes should attempt to read Hunters and Bu-
reaucrats before contemplating another decision. Unfor-
tunately, because of the way the book is written, it may not
be very accessible to those who could most benefit from its
message (i.e., Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal parties to
co-management and land claims). Nevertheless, much of
what is said in this book will strike a responsive chord in
the hearts and minds of most engaged in struggles to make
these processes work.
Hunters and Bureaucrats is actually one book and a
journal article. The “book” deals with the issue of Aborigi-
nal-state relations in co-management and how the Kluane
people have been forced into accepting the language and
institutions of “wildlife management” to protect their
